TESTING THE THEORY OF TOURNAMENTS - AN EMPIRICAL-ANALYSIS OF BROILER PRODUCTION

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: KNOEBER, CR; THURMAN, WN
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/298354
• 发表日期: 1994
• 页码: 155-179
• 关键词: relative performance evaluation; incentives; CONTRACTS; contests; prizes; pay

摘要

Broiler chickens are raised by contract growers whose rewards depend explicitly upon relative performance. We use data on the performance of broiler producers facing both tournament and linear performance evaluation compensation structures to test three predictions from the theory of tournaments: that changes in the level of prizes that leave prize differentials unchanged will not affect performance; that, in mixed tournaments, more able players will choose less risky strategies; and that tournament organizers will attempt to handicap players of unequal ability or reduce mixing to avoid the disincentive effects of mixed tournaments. Our evidence is consistent with each prediction.