UNION ATTITUDES TO LABOR-SAVING INNOVATION - WHEN ARE UNIONS LUDDITES

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: DOWRICK, S; SPENCER, BJ
• 署名单位: University of British Columbia
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/298359
• 发表日期: 1994
• 页码: 316-344
• 关键词: productivity; oligopoly; CONTRACTS; wages; price

摘要

The response of union utility to labor-saving innovation is analyzed within a framework of oligopolistic competition in the product market, taking account of wage bargaining under several alternative structures of industrial relations. Conditions are established under which wages and employment will rise or fall in response to innovation. Union opposition tends to occur when union preferences are weighted in favor of jobs and labor demand is perceived to be inelastic. Thus opposition is more likely with industry- or craft-based union organization in noncompetitive industries and is less likely with enterprise unionism in competitive industries.