Incomplete contracts and excludable public goods

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bierbrauer, Felix J.
• 署名单位: Max Planck Society
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.11.028
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 553-569
• 关键词: incomplete contracts; Excludable public goods; regulation

摘要

We study whether a firm that produces and sells access to an excludable public good should face a self-financing requirement, or, alternatively, receive subsidies that help to cover the cost of public-goods provision. The main result is that the desirability of a self-financing requirement is shaped by an equity-efficiency trade-off: while first-best efficiency is out of reach with such a requirement, its imposition limits the firm's ability of rent extraction. Hence, consumer surplus may be higher if the firm has no access to public funds. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.