Arm's length delegation of public services

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bennedsen, Morten; Schultz, Christian
• 署名单位: University of Copenhagen; INSEAD Business School
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.02.002
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 543-552
• 关键词: Outsourcing; Strategic delegation; Public service provision; incentives; Incomplete contracting; market power; Representative democracy

摘要

Delegation is a key feature of political decision making: Mayors or prime ministers delegate to subordinates, voters delegate to elected representatives. We analyze the effect of political delegation on public service provision and the choice between private or public providers when contracts are incomplete and incentives therefore distorted. We identify two important effects: The incentive effect increases the incentive part of service providers' remuneration and delegation may therefore be a substitute for an explicit complete incentive contract. The bargaining effect improves the bargaining position vis a vis a private firm with market power. In general, these effects imply that delegation improves public service provision. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.