Bargaining, compensating wage differentials, and dualism of the labor market: Theory and evidence for France

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Daniel, C; Sofer, C
• 署名单位: Universite de Orleans; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/209898
• 发表日期: 1998
• 页码: 546-575
• 关键词: trade-unions; EMPLOYMENT; EQUATIONS; britain; MODEL; RISK

摘要

The theory of compensating differentials predicts a negative relationship between wages and good working conditions, while the theory of segmentation predicts a positive one. Combining the hedonic wage model and the wages-employment collective bargaining model, we show the relevance of a further factor: a union power effect. Then we test the validity of this effect with French cross-section data. Empirical results confirm the predictions of the model, that is, the coexistence of a negative relationship between wages and good working conditions for the whole sample (market effect) and a positive relationship in highly unionized sectors (union power effect).