Unemployment compensation finance and efficiency wages

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Albrecht, JW; Vroman, SB
• 署名单位: Georgetown University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/209916
• 发表日期: 1999
• 页码: 141-167
• 关键词: insurance; models

摘要

This article examines the effects of unemployment compensation finance in a labor market in which firms pay efficiency wages. Two self-financing unemployment compensation systems are compared: one in which benefits are financed by a proportional payroll tax and another in which experience rating is introduced by taxing firms in proportion to their separations. We find that experience rating leads to less unemployment, less shirking, and higher output.