Learning in sequential wage negotiations: Theory and evidence

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kuhn, P; Gu, WL
• 署名单位: McMaster University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/209915
• 发表日期: 1999
• 页码: 109-140
• 关键词: asymmetric information model; cyclical fluctuations; strategic delay; strike activity; spillovers; unions

摘要

When union-firm pairs bargain sequentially, and when unobserved components of firms' abilities to pay are subject to correlated shocks, unions that bargain later in a sequence can acquire valuable information by observing previous bargaining outcomes in their industry. We derive the implications of this kind of learning in an asymmetric information model of wage negotiations and argue that the most robust implication is a lower incidence of strikes among followers than leaders in wage negotiations. Considerable empirical support for this implication is found in a long panel of Canadian contract negotiations.