Incumbency advantage and political campaign spending limits

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Pastine, Ivan; Pastine, Tuvana
• 署名单位: Maynooth University; University College Dublin
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.07.002
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 20-32
• 关键词: Campaign finance legislation; Spending cap; Expenditure limit; Preferential treatment all-pay auction; Contest; Head-start advantage

摘要

This paper presents a model which captures the three main arguments for and against campaign spending limits. Campaign spending limits are purported to restrict the incumbent's ability to exploit his fundraising advantage. In contrast to conventional wisdom, a ceiling increases the incumbent's probability of victory regardless of the candidates' relative fundraising abilities as long as the challenger is not more effective in campaign spending. If the challenger is more effective in campaign spending, ceilings have a non-monotonic effect when the incumbent enjoys a mild initial voter disposition advantage: A moderate ceiling decreases the incumbent's probability of victory but further restricting the limit favors the incumbent. Irrespective of incumbency status, the marginal benefit to quality decreases with a more restrictive cap. In an open-seat contest, a more restrictive limit improves the electoral prospects of the superior quality candidate. Stricter ceilings may lead to the unintended consequence of increased expected spending. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.