Centralized and decentralized decision making in organizations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Zábojník, J
• 署名单位: University of Southern California; Queens University - Canada
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/323929
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 1-22
• 关键词: hierarchies; firm; RESPONSIBILITY; COMMUNICATION; supervision; DELEGATION; authority; CONTRACTS; principal; agent

摘要

This article identifies a new type of cost associated with centralization. If workers are liquidity constrained, it may be less costly to motivate a worker who is allowed to work on his own idea than a worker who is forced to follow the manager's idea. Thus, it may be optimal to let workers decide on the method for doing their job even if managers have better information. This conclusion holds even if more general contracts are considered that are based on communication of information between the worker and the manager, as long as these general contracts are not entirely costless.