Monitoring and enforcement of environmental regulations Lessons from a natural field experiment in Norway

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Telle, Kjetil
• 署名单位: Statistics Norway
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.01.001
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 24-34
• 关键词: Environmental regulation; Monitoring and enforcement; EPA; Natural field experiment; random assignment

摘要

Relying on a small natural field experiment conducted by the Norwegian Environmental Protection Agency, I estimate effects of three fundamental elements of most monitoring and enforcement practices: self-reporting, audit frequency and specific deterrence. I find evidence of under-reporting of violations in firms' self-audits, as more violations are detected in on-site audits than in self-audits. Announcing the increased audit frequency has no effect on firms' compliance, but an audit raises subsequent compliance substantially. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.