Career concerns, contracts, and effort distortions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Andersson, F
• 署名单位: Lund University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/323931
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 42-58
• 关键词: work hours; rat race; incentives; ECONOMICS; provision; FIRMS

摘要

A two-period, career-concerns model with symmetric information but uncertainty about each worker's ability is analyzed. Contracts are unobservable, but incomes are observable. It is shown that effort is distorted upward by contracts being unobservable and that the distortion depends positively on turnover.