Asymmetric and non-atmospheric consumption externalities, and efficient consumption taxation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Eckerstorfer, Paul; Wendner, Ronald
• 署名单位: Johannes Kepler University Linz; University of Graz
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.07.003
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 42-56
• 关键词: Consumption externality; Keeping up with the Joneses; Efficient commodity taxation; Genuine altruism; Non-welfarist govemment

摘要

We analyze the effects of a generalized class of negative consumption externalities (asymmetric and nonatmospheric) on the structure of efficient commodity tax programs. Households are not only concerned about consumption reference levels that is, they gain utility from keeping up with the Joneses but they also exhibit altruism. Two sets of efficient tax regimes are compared, based, on a welfarist- and a non-welfarist optimality criterion, respectively. Altruism turns out not to be at odds with the consumption externalities. Rather, altruism implicates a bound on efficient utility allocations. A non-welfarist government tolerates less inequality than a welfarist one. In the welfarist (non-welfarist) case, first-best personalized commodity tax rates respond highly sensitively (barely) to whether or not a consumption externality is asymmetric or non-atmospheric. If personalized commodity tax rates are not available (second-best case), the tax rate on a non-positional good is typically different from zero for corrective reasons. For plausible functional forms and parameter values, numerical simulations suggest that second-best tax rates are rather insensitive with respect to both the optimality criterion and the nature of the consumption externality. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.