Selective counteroffers

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Barron, John M.; Berger, Mark C.; Black, Dan A.
• 署名单位: Purdue University System; Purdue University; Syracuse University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/504275
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 385-409
• 关键词: worker

摘要

The existence of counteroffers can lead to a variety of important labor-market features. This article develops a model of the selective use of counteroffers in which a firm decides whether to extend counteroffers after a worker informs the firm of an alternative offer. We outline factors that can influence the employer's net value of making a counteroffer and, thus, affect the likelihood of a counteroffer. We provide a new empirical analysis that examines whether proxies for these factors do, in fact, influence the likelihood that a firm would consider a counteroffer to an employee with a competing offer.