The tenuous relationship between effort and performance pay

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kvaloy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E.
• 署名单位: Universitetet i Stavanger; Norwegian School of Economics (NHH)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.10.007
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 32-39
• 关键词: Incentives; performance pay; Contract enforcement

摘要

When an agent is offered performance related pay, the incentive effect is not only determined by the shape of the incentive contract, but also by the probability of contract enforcement We show that weaker enforcement may reduce the agent's effort, but lead to higher-powered incentive contracts. This creates a seemingly negative relationship between effort and performance pay. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.