Marketplace Institutions Related to the Timing of Transactions: Reply to Priest

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Roth, Alvin E.
• 署名单位: Harvard University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/663621
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 479-494
• 关键词: gastroenterology fellowship match; labor-market; natural experiment; kidney exchange; DESIGN; physicians; rules; admissions; EVOLUTION; residents

摘要

In this reply I describe the unraveling of transaction dates in several markets, including the labor market for new lawyers hired by large law firms. This and other markets illustrate that unraveling can occur in markets with competitive prices, that it can result in substantial inefficiencies, and that marketplace institutions play a role in restoring efficiency. All of these contradict the conclusions of Priest.