Optimal wage redistribution in the presence of adverse selection in the labor market

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bastani, Spencer; Blumkin, Tomer; Micheletto, Luca
• 署名单位: Uppsala University; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Ben-Gurion University of the Negev; IZA Institute Labor Economics; University of Milan; Bocconi University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.08.005
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 41-57
• 关键词: Adverse selection; labor market; optimal taxation; pooling; redistribution

摘要

In this paper we highlight a novel role played by the non-linear income tax in the presence of adverse selection in the labor market due to asymmetric information between workers and firms. Relying on the Rothschild and Stiglitz equilibrium concept, we show that an appropriate choice of the tax schedule enables the government to affect the wage distribution by controlling the transmission of information in the labor market. This represents an additional channel through which the government can foster the pursuit of its redistributive goals. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.