Conflict networks

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Franke, Joerg; Oeztuerk, Tahir
• 署名单位: Dortmund University of Technology
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.04.002
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 104-113
• 关键词: Network games; conflicts; Conflict resolution

摘要

Conflict parties are frequently involved in more than one conflict simultaneously. In this paper the structure of local conflicts is modeled as a conflict network where rivals invest in conflict specific technology to attack their respective neighbors. We prove that there exists a unique equilibrium and examine the relation between total conflict investment (a proxy for conflict intensity) and underlying network characteristics. We also identify a class of conflict networks where peaceful conflict resolution is beneficial in the sense that conflict intensity is reduced. Outside of this class peaceful conflict resolution may be detrimental because countervailing local network effects can actually result in higher conflict intensity. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.