Kantian optimization: A microfoundation for cooperation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Roemer, John E.
• 署名单位: Yale University; Yale University; Yale University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.03.011
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 45-57
• 关键词: Kantian equilibrium; tragedy of the commons; other-regarding preferences; COOPERATION; implementation

摘要

Although evidence accrues in biology, anthropology and experimental economics that homo sapiens is a cooperative species, the reigning assumption in economic theory is that individuals optimize in an autarkic manner (as in Nash and Walrasian equilibrium). I here postulate a cooperative kind of optimizing behavior, called Kantian. It is shown that in simple economic models, when there are negative externalities (such as congestion effects from use of a commonly owned resource) or positive externalities (such as a social ethos reflected in individuals' preferences), Kantian equilibria dominate the Nash-Walras equilibria in terms of efficiency. While economists schooled in Nash equilibrium may view the Kantian behavior as utopian, there is some - perhaps much - evidence that it exists. If cultures evolve through group selection, the hypothesis that Kantian behavior is more prevalent than we may think is supported by the efficiency results here demonstrated. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.