Donor coordination in project funding: Evidence from a threshold public goods experiment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Corazzini, Luca; Cotton, Christopher; Valbonesi, Paola
• 署名单位: University of Messina; Bocconi University; Queens University - Canada; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics); University of Padua
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.05.005
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 16-29
• 关键词: threshold public goods; laboratory experiment; Charitable giving; Crowdfunding; Fundraising

摘要

We present results from an experiment with multiple public goods, where each good produces benefits only if total contributions to it reach a minimum threshold. The presence of multiple public goods makes coordination among participants more difficult, discouraging donor participation and decreasing the likelihood of any public good being effectively funded. Applied to the case of fundraising, the results show how overall donations and the number of effectively funded projects may both decrease as the total number of projects vying for funding increases. The analysis considers whether making one of the contribution options salient, either through its merits or by arbitrarily choosing one to feature during the experiment, helps overcome the increased coordination problem. The results have implications for the growing popularity of crowdfunding websites, and suggest benefits to these sites from helping donors compare and identify the most promising projects. (C) 2015 Elsevier BM. All rights reserved.