Government versus private ownership of public goods: The role of bargaining frictions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Schmitz, Patrick W.
• 署名单位: University of Cologne; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.09.009
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 23-31
• 关键词: ownership; incomplete contracts; investment incentives; Bargaining frictions; public goods

摘要

The government and a non-governmental organization (NGO) can invest in the provision of a public good. Who should be the owner of the public project? In an incomplete contracting model in which ex post negotiations are without frictions, the party that values the public good most should be the owner, regardless of technological aspects. However, under the plausible assumption that there are bargaining frictions, the optimal ownership structure depends on technological aspects and on the parties' valuations. We-show that the differences between incomplete contracting models with public goods and private goods are thus smaller than has previously been thought. (C) 2015 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V.