Basic versus supplementary health insurance: Moral hazard and adverse selection

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Boone, Jan
• 署名单位: Tilburg University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.05.009
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 50-58
• 关键词: Universal basic health insurance; Voluntary supplementary insurance; Public vs. private insurance; adverse selection; moral hazard; Cost effectiveness

摘要

This paper introduces a tractable model of health insurance with both moral hazard and adverse selection. We show that government sponsored universal basic insurance should cover treatments with the biggest adverse selection problems. Treatments not covered by basic insurance can be covered on the private supplementary insurance market. Surprisingly, the cost effectiveness of a treatment does not affect its priority to be covered by basic insurance. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.