The Effects of Prize Spread and Noise in Elimination Tournaments: A Natural Field Experiment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Delfgaauw, Josse; Dur, Robert; Non, Arjan; Verbeke, Willem
• 署名单位: Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Tinbergen Institute; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; IZA Institute Labor Economics; Maastricht University; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/679670
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 521-569
• 关键词: performance feedback; COMPENSATION; incentives; contests; INFORMATION; COMPETITION; promotions; reward; awards; tests

摘要

We conduct a natural field experiment in a retail chain to test predictions of tournament theory regarding prize spread and noise. A random subset of the 208 stores participates in two-stage elimination tournaments. Tournaments differ in the distribution of prize money across winners of the first and second rounds of the tournament. As predicted, we find that a more convex prize spread increases second-round performance at the expense of first-round performance, although the magnitude of these effects is small. Moreover, the treatment effect is larger for stores with more stable past performance.