Election cycles and electricity provision: Evidence from a quasi-experiment with Indian special elections

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Baskaran, Thushyanthan; Min, Brian; Uppal, Yogesh
• 署名单位: University of Gottingen; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; University System of Ohio; Youngstown State University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.03.011
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 64-73
• 关键词: electoral cycles; Electricity supply; Night lights; INDIA

摘要

We present evidence from India showing that state governments induce electoral cycles in electricity service provision. Our data and research strategy allow us to build on models of political business cycles and targeted distribution in two important ways. First, we demonstrate that by manipulating the flow of critical inputs into economic activity like electricity, elected leaders can influence economic outcomes even in contexts where they have constrained fiscal capacity. Second, we identify the effect of elections on electricity provision by focusing on special elections held for exogenous reasons. Our results show that state governments induce substantive increases in electricity service to constituencies that hold special elections. Manipulation of the power supply is stronger in contested constituencies and during special elections held in states where the government commands only a small majority. Overall, we find no evidence of positive welfare effects from the electoral manipulation of electricity supply. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.