Motivating Agents: How Much Does the Mission Matter?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Carpenter, Jeffrey; Gong, Erick
• 署名单位: Middlebury College; IZA Institute Labor Economics
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/682345
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 211-236
• 关键词: Incentives; field; ECONOMICS; altruism

摘要

Economic theory predicts that agents work harder if they believe in the mission of the organization. We conduct a real-effort experiment with workers whose mission preferences are known, randomly assigning them to organizations with clear missions to create both matches and mismatches. Our estimates suggest that matching is a strong motivator, especially compared to mismatches. Further, we find that performance pay increases effort, though mostly among mismatched workers who substitute pay for matching. Our results suggest the importance of defining a clear mission to an organization and highlight the significance of sorting, screening, and compensation policies.