Voting and optimal provision of a public good

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Shao, Ran; Zhou, Lin
• 署名单位: Yeshiva University; Shanghai Jiao Tong University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.12.006
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 35-41
• 关键词: public good; mechanisms; Dominant-incentive compatibility; VCG mechanisms; Quotas; committees

摘要

In this paper, we study the optimal provision of a costly public good using an average efficiency criterion. For every fixed cost, we identify a quota mechanism as the optimal mechanism among those that are dominant-incentive-compatible, deficit-free and kind. Moreover, we also consider the asymmetric case and demonstrate that a committee mechanism is optimal for a large class of mechanisms. In particular, this mechanism dominates all VCG (pivotal) mechanisms. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.