Divided we reform? Evidence from US welfare policies

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bernecker, Andreas
• 署名单位: University of Mannheim; University of Mannheim
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.08.003
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 24-38
• 关键词: Divided government; Legislative deadlock; Policy innovation; US welfare reform; Policy competition

摘要

Divided government is often thought of as causing legislative deadlock. I investigate the link between divided government and economic reforms using a novel data set on welfare reforms in US states between 1978 and 2010. Panel-data regressions show that, under divided government, a US state is around 25% snore likely to adopt a welfare reform than under unified government. Several robustness checks confirm this counter-intuitive finding. Case study evidence suggests an explanation based on policy competition between governor, senate, and house. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.