The Dynamic Effects of Educational Accountability

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Macartney, Hugh
• 署名单位: Duke University; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/682333
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 1-28
• 关键词: student outcomes; performance pay; teachers; ratchet; impacts; school; incentives; DESIGN

摘要

This paper provides the first evidence that value-added education accountability schemes induce dynamic distortions. Extending earlier dynamic moral hazard models, I propose a new test for ratchet effects, showing that classroominputs are distorted less when schools face a shorter horizon over which they can influence student performance. I then exploit grade span variation using rich educational data to credibly identify the extent of dynamic gaming and find compelling evidence of ratchet effects based on a triple-differences approach. Further analysis indicates that these effects are driven primarily by effort distortions, with teacher reallocations playing a secondary role.