Learning-by-Employing: The Value of Commitment under Uncertainty

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Camargo, Braz; Pastorino, Elena
• 署名单位: Getulio Vargas Foundation; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/684852
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 581-620
• 关键词: or-out contracts; career concerns; law firms; promotion; experimentation; ORGANIZATIONS; PERSPECTIVE; probation; turnover; rules

摘要

We analyze commitment to employment in an environment in which an infinitely lived firm faces a sequence of finitely lived workers who differ in their ability. A worker's ability is initially unknown, and a worker's effort affects how informative about ability the worker's performance is. We show that equilibria display commitment to employment only when effort has a delayed impact on output. In this case, insurance against early termination encourages workers to exert effort, thus allowing the firm to better identify workers' ability. Our results help explain the use of probationary appointments in environments in which workers' ability is uncertain.