Information, competition, and the quality of charities

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Krasteva, Silvana; Yildirim, Huseyin
• 署名单位: Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; Duke University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.10.008
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 64-77
• 关键词: Informed giving; Quality of charity; COMPETITION; All-pay auctions

摘要

Drawing upon the all-pay auction literature, we propose a model of charity competition in which informed giving alone can account for the significant quality heterogeneity across similar charities. Our analysis identifies a negative effect of competition and a positive effect of informed giving on the equilibrium quality of charity. In particular, we show that as the number of charities grows, so does the percentage of charity scams, approaching one in the limit. In light of this and other results, we discuss the need for regulating nonprofit entry and conduct as well as promoting informed giving. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.