Who benefits when the government pays more? Pass-through in the Medicare Advantage program

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Duggan, Mark; Starc, Amanda; Vabson, Boris
• 署名单位: Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.07.003
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 50-67
• 关键词: Medicare; incidence; health insurance; Contracting out

摘要

Governments contract with private,firms to provide a wide range of services. While a large body of previous work has estimated the effects of that contracting, surprisingly little has investigated how those effects vary with the generosity of the contract. In this paper we examine this issue in the Medicare Advantage (MA) program, through which the federal government contracts with private insurers to coordinate and finance health care for 17 million Medicare recipients. To do this, we exploit a substantial policy-induced increase in MA reimbursement in metropolitan areas with a population of 250,000 or more relative to MSAs below this threshold. Our results demonstrate that the additional reimbursement leads more private firms to enter this market and to an increase in the share of Medicare recipients enrolled in MA plans. Our findings also reveal that about one-eighth of the additional reimbursement is passed through to consumers in the form of better coverage. A somewhat larger share accrues to private insurers in the form of higher profits and we find suggestive evidence of a large impact on advertising expenditures. Our results have implications for a key feature of the Affordable Care Act that will reduce reimbursement to MA plans by $156 billion from 2013 to 2022. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.