Unemployment Insurance and Disability Insurance in the Great Recession

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mueller, Andreas I.; Rothstein, Jesse; von Wachter, Till M.
• 署名单位: Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research; IZA Institute Labor Economics; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/683140
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: S445-S475
• 关键词: rolls

摘要

Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) awards rise during recessions. If marginal applicants are able to work but unable to find jobs, countercyclical Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefit extensions may reduce SSDI uptake. Exploiting UI extensions in the Great Recession as a source of variation, we find no indication that expiration of UI benefits causes SSDI applications and can rule out effects of meaningful magnitude. A supplementary analysis finds little overlap between the two programs' recipient populations: only 28% of SSDI awardees had any labor force attachment in the prior calendar year, and of those, only 4% received UI.