Does medical malpractice law improve health care quality?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Frakes, Michael; Jena, Anupam B.
• 署名单位: Duke University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Harvard University; Harvard University Medical Affiliates; Massachusetts General Hospital; Harvard Medical School
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.09.002
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 142-158
• 关键词: Malpractice; Health care quality; deterrence; defensive medicine

摘要

We assess the potential for medical liability forces to deter medical errors and improve health care treatment quality, identifying liability's influence by drawing on variations in the manner by which states formulate the negligence standard facing physicians. Using hospital discharge records from the National Hospital Discharge Survey and clinically-validated quality metrics inspired by the Agency for Health Care Research and Quality, we find evidence suggesting that treatment quality may improve upon reforms that expect physicians to adhere to higher quality clinical standards. We do not find evidence, however, suggesting that treatment quality may deteriorate following reforms to liability standards that arguably condone the delivery of lower quality care. Similarly, we do not find evidence of deterioration in health care quality following remedy-focused liability reforms such as caps on non-economic damages awards. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.