Monitoring for Worker Quality

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bose, Gautam; Lang, Kevin
• 署名单位: University of New South Wales Sydney; Boston University; National Bureau of Economic Research; IZA Institute Labor Economics
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/690713
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 755-785
• 关键词: personnel data; FIRMS; wage; promotions; DYNAMICS; performance; EFFICIENCY

摘要

Much nonmanagerial work is routine, with all workers having similar output most of the time. However, failure to address occasional challenges can be very costly, and consequently easily detected, while challenges handled well pass unnoticed. We analyze job assignment and worker monitoring for such guardian jobs. If monitoring costs are positive but small, monitoring is nonmonotonic in the firm's belief about the probability that a worker is good. The model explains several empirical regularities regarding nonmanagerial internal labor markets: low use of performance pay, seniority pay, rare demotions, wage ceilings within grade, and wage jumps at promotion.