Divided majority and information aggregation: Theory and experiment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bouton, Laurent; Castanheira, Micael; Llorente-Saguer, Aniol
• 署名单位: Georgetown University; Universite Libre de Bruxelles; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; National Bureau of Economic Research; Fonds de la Recherche Scientifique - FNRS; University of London; Queen Mary University London
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.11.003
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 114-128
• 关键词: Multicandidate elections; information aggregation; Plurality; Approval voting; laboratory experiments

摘要

We propose a theory-based experimental approach to compare the properties of approval voting (AV) with those of plurality. This comparison is motivated by the theoretical prediction that, in our aggregate uncertainty setup, AV should produce close to first-best outcomes, while plurality will not. The experiment shows, first, that welfare gains are substantial. Second, both aggregate and individual responses are in line with theoretical predictions, and thus with strategic voting. Finally, subjects' behavior under AV highlights the need to study equilibria in asymmetric strategies. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.