Special interests and the media: Theory and an application to climate change

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Shapiro, Jesse M.
• 署名单位: Brown University; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.10.004
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 91-108
• 关键词: Persuasion; Global warming; strategic communication

摘要

A journalist reports to a voter on an unknown, policy-relevant state. Competing special interests can make claims that contradict the facts but seem credible to the voter. A reputational incentive to avoid taking sides leads the journalist to report special interests' claims to the voter. In equilibrium, the voter can remain uninformed even when the journalist is perfectly informed. Communication is improved if the journalist discloses her partisan leanings. The model provides an account of persistent public ignorance on climate change that is consistent with narrative and quantitative evidence. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.