Tax policy and the financing of innovation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Campodonico, Luis A. Bryce; Bonfatti, Roberto; Pisano, Luigi
• 署名单位: University of Nottingham; Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.12.010
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 32-46
• 关键词: innovation; Tax policy; asymmetric information; adverse selection

摘要

We study tax policy in a Schumpeterian growth model with asymmetric information in the financing of innovation. Investors cannot a priori distinguish between more or less talented entrepreneurs. Net-worth allows talented entrepreneurs to self-invest and avoid being pooled with less talented entrepreneurs in the credit market. Increasing net-worth boosts innovation even when financed through higher profit taxes. Taxing consumption effectively raises net-worth and subsidizes profits simultaneously. Sufficiently taxing consumption implements the social optimum free of adverse selection. If forced to tax consumption less, the government implements a second best allocation with adverse selection when boosting net-worth enough to avoid adverse selection requires taxing profit's excessively. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.