Public and Private Employer Learning: Evidence from the Adoption of Teacher Value Added

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bates, Michael
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Riverside
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/705881
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 375-420
• 关键词: Asymmetric information; adverse selection; mobility; QUALITY; layoffs; schools; MODEL

摘要

Informational asymmetries between employers may inhibit optimal worker mobility. However, researchers rarely observe shocks to employers' information. I exploit two school districts' adoptions of value-added (VA) measures of teacher effectiveness-informational shocks to some, but not all, employers-to provide direct tests of asymmetric employer learning. I develop a learning model and test its predictions for teacher mobility. I find that adopting VA increases within-district mobility of high-VA teachers, while low-VA teachers move out of district to uninformed principals. These patterns are consistent with asymmetric employer learning. This sorting from widespread VA adoption exacerbates inequality in access to effective teaching.