Charter school entry and school choice: The case of Washington, D.C

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ferreyra, Maria Marta; Kosenok, Grigory
• 署名单位: The World Bank; New Economic School
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.12.008
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 160-182
• 关键词: Charter schools; School entry; school choice; general equilibrium

摘要

This paper develops and estimates an equilibrium model of charter school entry and school choice. In the model, households choose among public, private, and charter schools, and a regulator authorizes charter entry and mandates charter exit. The model is estimated for Washington, D.C. According to the estimates, charters generate net social gains by providing additional school options, and they benefit non-white, low-income, and middle-school students the most. Further, policies that raise the supply of prospective charter entrants in combination with high authorization standards enhance social welfare.