Education and propaganda: Tradeoffs to public education provision in nondemocracies

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Testa, Patrick A.
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Irvine
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.03.001
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 66-81
• 关键词: public education; propaganda; Political Participation; second-best; Development; human capital; Social capital; Nondemocracy

摘要

Nondemocratic regimes face a tradeoff when investing in public education. Education promotes human capital acquisition, expanding the tax base. Yet it also enhances political sophistication and participation, at a cost to nondemocratic regimes. To relax this tradeoff, a regime can disseminate propaganda through its education system. I show that even Bayesian citizens can be influenced by propaganda. By deterring political opposition, propaganda can induce nondemocracies to invest in education when they otherwise would not, improving social welfare. When propaganda is too strong, however, it can generate a backlash. Using cross-country and survey data, I find evidence consistent with the predictions.