Setting the bar - an experimental investigation of immigration requirements

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Khadjavi, Menusch; Tjaden, Jasper D.
• 署名单位: Leibniz Association; Institut fur Weltwirtschaft an der Universitat Kiel (IFW); University of Kiel; International Organization for Migration
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.07.013
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 160-169
• 关键词: immigration; public good; Endogenous groups; voting; experiment

摘要

We examine determinants of immigration requirements in a public goods game experiment with endogenous groups. Initially, the game consists of in-group players who enjoy an existing public good and out-group players who may subsequently enter the group. Motivated by different current migration flows and anti-immigration sentiments, our treatments are crafted to investigate how migrants' power of self-determination and public debate among in-group players shape immigration requirements. We employ the minimal group paradigm and immigration requirements are set by in-group voting. In order to immigrate, out-group players have to fulfill minimal contribution requirements. Public debate fosters coherence between the requirements and in-group players' contributions if migrants are free to reject requirements. Conversely, public debate among in-group players fosters economic exploitation of migrants with less bargaining power. Overall the study illustrates the novel potential of applying well-established tools from experimental economics to migration questions. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.