Popularity shocks and political selection

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cavalcanti, Francisco; Daniele, Gianmarco; Galletta, Sergio
• 署名单位: University of Barcelona; Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich; Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.07.011
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 201-216
• 关键词: Political selection; CORRUPTION; competence; Local election; Political parties

摘要

We observe that popularity shocks are crucial for electoral accountability beyond their effects on voters' behaviors. By focusing on Brazilian politics, we show that the disclosure of audit reports on the (mis)use of federal funds by local administrators affects the type of candidates who stand for election. When the audit finds low levels of corruption, the parties supporting the incumbent select less-educated candidates. On the contrary, parties pick more-educated candidates when the audit reveals a high level of corruption. These effects are stronger in municipalities that have easier access to local media. (C) 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.