An offer you can refuse: The effect of transparency with endogenous conflict of interest*

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kartal, Melis; Tremewan, James
• 署名单位: Vienna University of Economics & Business
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.04.003
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 44-55
• 关键词: Experimental game theory; strategic information transmission; TRANSPARENCY; Conflict of interest; lobbying

摘要

We study the effects of transparency on information transmission and decision making theoretically and experimentally. We develop a model in which a decision maker seeks advice from a better-informed adviser whose advice might be swayed by financial incentives. Transparency enables the decision maker to learn whether or not the adviser accepted such an incentive, for example from an interested third party. Prior theoretical and experimental research mostly found that transparency is ineffective or harmful to decision makers. Our model predicts that transparency is never harmful and, depending on equilibrium selection, may improve the accuracy of decision makers. In our experiment transparency does indeed improve accuracy, especially if it is mandatory. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.