Competition in public service provision: The role of not-for-profit providers

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Besley, Timothy; Malcomson, James M.
• 署名单位: University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR); University of Oxford
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.04.004
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 158-172
• 关键词: Public services; COMPETITION; Not-for-profit providers

摘要

With public services such as health and education, it is not straightforward for consumers to assess the quality of provision. Many such services are provided by monopoly not-for-profit providers and there is concern that for-profit providers may increase profit at the expense of quality. This paper explores the implications of entry by for-profit providers when there is unobserved quality. The model generates three key policy relevant insights. First, by developing a novel approach to competition between different organizational forms, it frames the relevant trade-offs precisely. Second, it shows the value of keeping an incumbent not-for-profit as an active provider. Third, it characterizes the optimal payment (or voucher value) to an entrant for each consumer who switches in a way that can be applied empirically. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.