The right type of legislator: A theory of taxation and representation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mattozzi, Andrea; Snowberg, Erik
• 署名单位: European University Institute; University of British Columbia; California Institute of Technology; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.01.009
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 54-65
• 关键词: Citizen candidates; taxation; redistribution; REPRESENTATION; legislatures

摘要

We develop a theory of taxation and the distribution of government spending in a citizen-candidate model of legislatures. Individuals are heterogeneous in two dimensions: productive ability in the private sector and negotiating ability in politics. When these are positively correlated, rich voters always prefer a rich legislator, but poor voters face a trade-off. A rich legislator will secure more pork for the district, but will also prefer lower taxation than the poor voter. Our theory organizes a number of stylized facts across countries about taxation and redistribution, parties, and class representation in legislatures. We demonstrate that spending does not necessarily increase when the number of legislators increases, as the standard common-pool intuition suggests, and that many policies aimed at increasing descriptive representation may have the opposite effect.