Do Less Informative College Admission Exams Reduce Earnings Inequality? Evidence from Colombia

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Riehl, Evan
• 署名单位: Cornell University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/725167
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 1009-1047
• 关键词: affirmative-action bans; selective college; students evidence; returns; QUALITY; enrollment; performance; graduation; university; education

摘要

This paper asks whether reducing the informativeness of college admission exams reduces inequality in postcollege earnings. I examine a 2000 reform of the Colombian college admission exam that sought to reduce bias in scores. The reform reduced test score gaps between high- and low-income students by nearly 50% in some subjects, but it also decreased the exam's predictive power for abilities that matter in college. I find that the reform caused students to attend colleges where they were more likely to drop out, which reduced earnings for both high- and low-income students.