Dynamic reform of public institutions: A model of motivated agents and collective reputation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Valasek, Justin
• 署名单位: Norwegian School of Economics (NHH); Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.10.005
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 94-108
• 关键词: Motivated workers; Institutional reform; Public sector

摘要

State capacity is optimized when public institutions are staffed by individuals with public-service motivation. However, when motivated agents value the collective reputation of their place of employment, steady-state equilibria with both high and low aggregate motivation (reputation) in the mission-oriented sector exist. Reforming a low-motivation institution requires a non-monotonic wage path: since the effect of higher wages on motivation is negative for a high-reputation institution, but positive for a low-reputation institution, a transition to a high-reputation steady state requires an initial wage increase to crowd motivated workers in, followed by a wage decrease to crowd non-motivated workers out. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.