The Efficacy of Tournaments for Nonroutine Team Tasks

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Englmaier, Florian; Grimm, Stefan; Grothe, Dominik; Schindler, David; Schudy, Simeon
• 署名单位: University of Munich; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; IZA Institute Labor Economics; University of Munich; Tilburg University; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Ulm University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/725553
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 921-948
• 关键词: field experiment; social identity; incentives; performance; COMPETITION; creativity; contests; GENDER; prizes; awards

摘要

Tournaments are often used to improve performance in innovation contexts. Tournaments provide monetary incentives but also render teams' identity and image concerns salient. We study the effects of tournaments on team performance in a nonroutine task and identify the importance of these behavioral aspects. In a field experiment (n > 1,700 participants), we vary the salience of team identity, social image concerns, and whether teams face monetary incentives. Increased salience of team identity does not improve performance. Social image motivates the top performers. Additional monetary incentives improve all teams' outcomes without crowding out teams' willingness to explore or perform similar tasks again.