Decentralization and efficiency of subsidy targeting: Evidence from chiefs in rural Malawi

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Pia Basurto, Maria; Dupas, Pascaline; Robinson, Jonathan
• 署名单位: Universidad del Pacifico Peru; Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.07.006
• 发表日期: 2020
• 关键词: Nepotism; productive efficiency; political economy; Agricultural inputs; Chiefs; subsidies

摘要

Lower-income countries spend vast sums on subsidies. Beneficiaries are typically selected via either a proxymeans test (PMT) or through a decentralized identification process led by local leaders. A decentralized allocation may offer informational advantages, but may be prone to elite capture. We study this trade-off in the context of two large-scale subsidy programs in Malawi (for agricultural inputs and food) decentralized to traditional leaders (chiefs) who are asked to target the needy. Using household panel data, we find that nepotism exists but has only limited mistargeting consequences. Importantly, we find that chiefs target households with higher returns to farm inputs, generating an allocation that is more productively efficient than what could be achieved through strict poverty-targeting. This could be welfare improving, since within-village redistribution is common. Productive efficiency targeting is concentrated in villages with above-median levels of redistribution. (C) 2019 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.