A model of a team contest, with an application to incentives under list proportional representation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Crutzen, Benoit S. Y.; Flamand, Sabine; Sahuguet, Nicolas
• 署名单位: Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Universitat Rovira i Virgili; Universitat Rovira i Virgili; Universite de Montreal; HEC Montreal
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.104109
• 发表日期: 2020
• 关键词: Elections; Open lists; Closed lists; proportional representation; contests; Multiple prizes

摘要

We develop a model of a team contest for multiple, indivisible prizes. Team members exert costly effort to improve their team's success. We analyze two intrateam allocation rules. Under a list rule, prizes are allocated according to a predetermined list. Under an egalitarian rule, prizes are allocated according to a fair lottery. We show that which allocation rule maximizes team success depends on the degree of complementarity between members' efforts and the convexity of the individual cost of effort function. We then apply the model to the context of elections under proportional representation with both open and closed lists. We derive conditions under which closed lists generate stronger incentives than open lists. Our results offer a rationale for the lack of evidence on the negative incentive effects of closed lists. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.