Tax enforcement using a hybrid between self- and third-party reporting

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Clifford, Sarah; Mavrokonstantis, Panos
• 署名单位: University of Oxford; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2021.104519
• 发表日期: 2020
• 关键词: Tax enforcement; tax compliance; Charitable giving; Tax design

摘要

We study a tax enforcement policy combining elements of self-and third-party reporting. Taxpayers self-report to the authority but must file documentation issued by a third-party to corroborate claims. Exploiting salary-dependent cutoffs governing documentation requirements when claiming deductions for charitable contributions in Cyprus, we estimate that deductions increase by 0.7 pound when taxpayers can claim 1 pound more without documentation. Second, using a retroactive reform we find that at least 64% of the response is purely a reporting adjustment representing mainly over-reporting of deductions. Finally, reporting rules drive the behaviour of many taxpayers who display little responsiveness to finan-cial incentives for giving. (c) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.